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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the benefits for wind power producers to trade in the intraday electricity markets 
in a context of massive penetration of intermittent renewables. Using a simple analytical model we 
find out that there are situations when it will be costly for those producers to adjust their positions in 
intraday markets. A first key factor is of course the technical flexibility of the power system: if highly 
flexible units provide energy at very low prices in real-time there is no point in participating into 
intraday markets. Besides, we identify the way wind production forecast errors evolve constitutes 
another essential, although less obvious, key-factor. Both the value of the standard error and the 
correlation between forecasts errors at different gate closures will determine the strategy of the wind 
power producers. Policy implications of our results are the following: low liquidity in intraday markets 
will be unavoidable for given sets of technical parameters, it will also be inefficient in some cases to 
set discrete auctions in intraday markets, and compelling players to adjust their position in intraday 
markets will then generate additional costs.  
Keywords 
Market design, intraday markets, wind forecasts, large-scale renewables, intermittency. 
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1. Introduction* 
If the European Union countries are to meet their Climate Policy objectives by 2020, they will have to 
employ large amounts of intermittent renewables sources of electricity. Given the potential and 
maturity of available technologies, wind farms and photovoltaic power to a lesser extent will 
constitute a significant share of these new plants.  
The integration of a significant share of variable renewables in the generation mix is a source of 
economic and technical challenges. Managing power systems featuring a large penetration of wind 
generators is challenging for two main reasons: wind generation is variable and not perfectly 
predictable
1
. While the impacts of these two technical properties remain limited in currently existing 
power systems, they will become significant in a context of massive development of variable 
renewables. They could also constitute a major obstacle to the integration of wind farms into 
electricity markets.  
Renewables are currently isolated from electricity markets in most power systems as they benefit 
from feed-in-tariff schemes, priority dispatch or exemption from balancing charges. Klessmann, Nabe 
et al. (2008) argue that to ensure cost-reflective integration of wind farms into electricity markets wind 
players should be given both the possibility and the incentives to adjust their operations. We study in 
this article the case when intermittent RES are considered as a standard generator and we focus on one 
of the possible solutions to manage the low predictability of electricity generation by wind farms: the 
use of Intraday Markets (IM). Wind forecasts improve significantly when realised closer to generation 
time as illustrated in Figure 1. Giving generators a chance to adjust in the IM their commitments 
realised in the Day-Ahead markets could help renewables to lower their imbalance costs. 
Figure 1: Wind forecasts accuracy depending on the time horizon for Germany and three 
transmission zones (Source: (Borggrefe and Neuhoff 2011)) 
 
Intraday markets give players an opportunity to trade and to modify their production schedules after 
the day-ahead gate-closure. They are already in place in most European countries but their design is 
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subject to significant variations. They can in particular be continuous (Germany, Denmark, France) or 
feature discrete auctions (Spain, Italy). Despite wind already representing a significant share of 
generated electricity in several countries, liquidity in IM remains low and the share of electricity 
traded in IM is quite incidental
2
. Weber (2010) distinguished two possible explanations for poor 
liquidity. A first reason could be poor market design. In this case, it can moreover become a self-
sustaining phenomenon, as the absence of liquidity reduces the trust of participants into IM. Another 
possible explanation can be the absence of a real need for IM, i.e. a question of market structure
3
. 
There is a fundamental difference between these two drivers with consequences regarding policies to 
adopt. For instance, from January 1, 2010, TSOs are required in Germany to balance any difference 
between volumes of power from renewable sources sold in the Day-Ahead auction and the feed-in 
based on the intraday forecast (Besnier 2009). While such a regulatory measure will lead to a higher 
liquidity in the IM, we argue it could also lead to additional costs. The purpose of this article is to 
study under what conditions it will be beneficial for wind generators to trade in IM to manage wind 
low-predictability.  
We build a simple analytical model to study how the prediction error for electricity generated by 
wind farms for a given generation time can be managed in IM. In order to focus on the effects of low-
predictability for a single hour, we do not consider interdependency between adjacent generation 
times. We suppose wind generators are aggregated into a single player who commits to generate a 
given quantity in Day-Ahead markets. Due to forecast errors, this player is exposed to imbalance costs 
when the actual output is different from its financial position. This player is also given the possibility 
to adjust its commitments by interacting with thermal generators
4
 at a set of gates within the IM. We 
also introduce a parameter to take into account the system flexibility in our model. Due to the limited 
technical flexibility of thermal generators, it is more expensive to procure energy on short-notice
5
.  
We use this model to study the average profits of a wind power producer using the best predictions 
available to adjust its position in selected gates from IM and compare it to the average profits realised 
by a producer adopting a more passive attitude. It is less expensive to manage imbalances earlier, but 
there is a risk of correcting self-compensating deviations. This process allows us to establish a set of 
critical values for the technical properties of the forecast error. Relevant parameters include standard 
error, correlation between errors at different times, and additional costs of purchasing electricity closer 
to real-time. Our results indicate that the value of these parameters will determine whether it is a good 
strategy for the producer to use updated predictions to trade in the intraday market at a given time. As 
these parameters evolve with each gate-closure time, setting discrete auctions at a sub-optimal time 
will deter participants from trading within this time period.  
2. Previous works 
Despite the relatively low volume of electricity currently traded in intraday markets, their alleged 
potential to assist the integration of intermittent renewables such as wind led to the development of a 
range of studies focusing on this topic. For example, Borggrefe and Neuhoff (2011) and Hiroux and 
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 In 2009, the volume traded within the organised IM in Germany was 4.2% of the volume traded in the organised Day-
Ahead market. For the same year in Spain, the volume traded in the MIBEL IM was under 16% of the total volume 
traded within the organised markets. (Source: Barquin 2011)  
3
 Stoft (2002) for instance employed “market structure” by opposition to “market architecture” to refer to properties of the 
market closely tied to technology and ownership. We will stick to this definition in this article.  
4
 In this article, the term “thermal generators” is used to refer to all units considered as having a predictable output. Thus 
large hydropower can also be included in this abusive simplification.  
5
 According to a recent study by the MIT Energy Initiative (2012), nuclear plants (featuring low marginal costs) require six 
to eight hours to ramp up to full load, while coal plants can ramp their output at 1.5%-3% per minute. The most flexible 
coal units are the smaller and older plants with less efficiency.  
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Saguan (2010) both mentioned the use of IM to manage wind low-predictability. Borggrefe and 
Neuhoff (2011) presented intraday markets as a tool to keep the volume of balancing services low in 
systems featuring a significant penetration of intermittent renewables but did not consider oscillating 
predictions
6
. Hiroux and Saguan (2010) argued setting the gate closure that closes intraday markets 
near real-time would help to reduce wind integration balancing costs. 
A first category of studies focusing on the IM consists of empirical analysis of players’ 
participation in IM, such as Weber (2010) and Furió, Lucia et al. (2009). Weber (2010) focused on the 
volume exchanged in several European Intraday Markets. He estimated a theoretical potential for 
position adjustments of wind generators in intraday markets and deduced that the amount of exchanges 
reached in these markets were quite low when compared to this potential. He considered several 
possible explanations from poor market design to inadequate market structure and argued that a key 
issue for efficient integration of wind energy was an efficient functioning of IM. Yet no clear 
conclusion was reached regarding the exact source of low liquidity. Furió et al. (2009) realised a 
statistical analysis of trades made in the Spanish Intraday markets. This study revealed that about two 
thirds of the exchanges realised within each of the six trading sessions were linked to the hourly 
horizons negotiated for the last time in this session. Most of the time only one gate out of six was 
really used by participants. They furthermore added the low liquidity calculated could be due to an 
absence of need to make adjustments in the IM. 
A second category of studies features models to estimate the value for wind power generators of 
trading into intraday markets. Usaola and Angarita (2007) considered three possible strategies in IM: 
no bidding, bidding best prediction, and an “optimal” strategic bidding. The frame was the Spanish 
IM, prices were inputs based on historical data, and only one intermediate step was considered in the 
IM. Results indicated bidding the best prediction was not the optimal strategy and that it was 
sometimes even preferable not to play at all in IM. Similar results were obtained by De Vos, De Rijcke 
et al. (2011) in the Belgian context. Day-Ahead (DA) and Balancing Mechanism (BM) prices were 
inputs taken from the Belgium Power Exchange BELPEX while IM prices were estimated through 
linear interpolation between DA and BM prices. Increasing total balancing costs resulting from trading 
into IM were explained by oscillating predictions. Maupas (2008) employed a quite sophisticated 
approach using a power system simulation and modelling the interaction between intraday and 
balancing markets. He established that it was not beneficial to trade into IM with poor liquidity due to 
interactions between the different hourly provision horizons. In Maupas’ model, poor liquidity was an 
exogenous input taken into consideration by setting intraday market prices closer to the BM prices 
than to the DA prices.  
While wind and intraday markets have hence been subject to different approaches, we believe there 
is room for further investigation. While there seems to be a general intuition in the studies mentioned 
in this section that trading in IM could result in higher costs in case of poor liquidity and oscillating 
predictions, the calculations made so far did not establish for what kind of forecast precision and for 
what market flexibility it was the case. By using a simpler analytical model, we might not be able to 
deliver accurate numerical results but we will be able to focus on the role played by two key technical 
components: forecast accuracy and system flexibility. 
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3. Model 
3.1 Modelling framework 
In our analytical model, wind generators are aggregated into a single player. This player could 
represent a utility operating the totality of wind power plants, a national aggregator, or a TSO 
responsible for managing wind intermittency as it is the case in Germany.  
Our player generates energy using installed wind capacity and is also able to procure energy 
from thermal generators in electricity markets. At the gate-closure time of the day-ahead market, this 
player plans to generate a given quantity of wind energy for a final production horizon. However due 
to imperfect forecast, the final output will be different from the player position. This “wind player” 
will therefore need to manage imbalances.  
We compare different strategies in our model ranging from a completely passive strategy to an 
extremely active strategy. A completely passive strategy is to “do nothing” and pay the balancing costs 
when the final production is realised: this is the case when it is not possible to trade into IM or when 
the player is not taking part into these markets. An extremely active strategy is to use the updated 
forecast available at each gate of the IM: the wind player will then be interacting with the thermal 
generators to adjust its positions
7
. As a result, the active player will need to buy or sell less energy in 
balancing markets (only the remaining error at the last intraday market gate closure) but might buy and 
sell more energy in the intraday markets due to oscillating predictions. The completely passive 
strategy and the extremely active strategy constitute the two extreme possibilities of a much more 
complex set of strategies: in practice, in our model, at each available gate of the IM, the player can 
choose whether to adjust its position using the best available forecast. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: 
Illustration of two possible strategies: the player chooses to participate in IM at gates H-24, H-
12, H-4 and H-2 (left side) vs. the player decides not to participate at all in IM (right side) 
 
We assume that the evolution of the system imbalance is driven by wind generation imbalances, which 
is a reasonable assumption in a system featuring a significant share of variable renewables. Indeed 
while load is also uncertain the errors will then be smaller and their evolution is easier to anticipate 
(Maupas 2008).  
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 If the updated forecast indicates a higher output than the previous forecast the wind player can sell more energy. If the 
updated wind forecast indicates a lower output the wind player must buy energy. 
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We assume thermal generators have a limited flexibility. The least flexible plants will not be able 
to adapt their production to the demand when getting closer to the production horizon or will only be 
able to adapt it in a restricted way respecting ramping constraints. They will therefore withdraw part of 
their offers from the supply function, as illustrated in Figure 3. The resulting inverse supply function 
will therefore feature a steeper slope, and prices will get more expensive when getting closer to the 
production horizon
8
. Moreover, the units most likely to provide the required flexibility to manage 
wind variability are usually the ones with high marginal costs
9
 (see IEA (2012)). 
Figure 3: Evolution of the economic merit-order due to limited flexibility 
 
At last, energy procured in real-time is not always charged at cost-reflective prices (Vandezande, 
Meeus et al. 2010). Penalties can be imposed by the system operator to provide ex-ante balancing 
incentives to participants. Such penalties could be included in our model by higher prices for energy 
procured and lower revenues from selling energy in real-time markets. Due to these extra-costs, 
participants should then have higher incentives to participate in intraday markets. 
3.2 Model implementation 
Wind player behaviour 
At time , the wind player plans to generate a wind energy quantity  at time  using the best 
available forecast.  
The wind player is then given the possibility to adjust its position at a set of gates determined by 
market rules. Among the eligible gates, the player will choose to participate (adopt an active strategy) 
in n-1 gates at times . This player is therefore taking part in n+1 gates at 
times :  is the day-ahead market gate closure time,  is the production horizon 
when electricity must be generated, and  are the closure time of the intraday 
market gates at which the player is deciding to adjust its position. For instance, in figure 2 the player 
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these generators, as they are the most flexible, can choose to sell their production at any time-horizon. It is likely they 
will sell their production in earlier markets if prices are higher in these higher markets. 
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decides to participate in IM at gates H-24, H-12, H-4 and H-2 and the  are then  = H-24,  = H-12, 
 = H-4,  = H-2 and = H. 
At time , this player will then use the updated production forecast . The player will cover the 
quantity  =  -  buying energy from thermal generators.  is hereby defined as the net demand at 
time . This player following the active strategy at time  and  will then buy the 
quantity  at time . This amount of energy is by definition equal to . 
At the final time , the wind player will cover the net demand and pay the corresponding 
imbalance costs. A player having adopted the active strategy in gate  will be charged the costs 
corresponding to the remaining energy quantity . By opposition, a player having adopted the 
passive strategy will be charged the costs corresponding to the energy quantity .  
The quantities  are random variables whose behaviour depends on the wind farms 
characteristics and the wind nature itself. In order to make calculations simpler, we define the variable 
representing the wind production forecast error at time  as a share of the realised wind production.  
 
The resulting random variable  has an expected value  and a variance . We suppose  and 
 are independent: 
 
It is important to note that there is a difference of nature between , and . While 
the former constitute forecasts of the net demand and depend also on the properties of the forecasting 
tool, the latter is related to the final amount of electricity generated. is in particular equal to zero by 
definition. We will therefore introduce for more clarity a different notation: is the variance of 
.  
Prices formation 
In our model wind power producers interact with thermal generators to buy the extra energy they need 
or to sell surplus energy. Demand-side is not considered as we suppose the balancing needs driven by 
the consumption-forecast error will be insignificant in a power system featuring high penetration by 
intermittent RES. While outages of thermal units will still be relevant for the network security we 
considered that due to the low frequency of occurrence they could be neglected in our financial 
analysis. The available thermal generators obey at time to the following aggregated inverse supply 
function. For a net demand , the corresponding price is: 
 
The price function is therefore linear and parameters a and b are inputs that depend on the power 
system properties. The variable b will be higher when the range of marginal costs of the different 
generation units will be higher. 
The evolution of costs of dealing with imbalances will play a significant part in the trade-off wind 
generators are to face. To take this phenomenon into account in our model we introduce a flexibility 
parameter  and an associated “penalty function” . We suppose the value of β goes from 0 when 
the system is not flexible at all to 1 when the flexibility is infinite. We assume the value of the penalty 
fucntion  increases with time t and decreases with flexibility parameter : the extra cost of 
trading later is higher closer to real time and when the system flexibility is lower. If all thermal plants 
are perfectly flexible, then  and we suppose . 
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We suppose a producer who committed at time  to buy the quantity  and trading the 
quantity  at time  will pay a price . The resulting price function obeys to the 
following equation graphically illustrated in Figure 4 :  
 
 
In case , the cost of managing imbalances does not depend on the time of procurement. In all 
other cases the same quantity of electricity bought later by wind generators will be more costly, while 
electricity sold later by wind generators will lead to lower profits. 
Figure 4: Evolution of the inverse supply function in our model 
 
It is important to point out that representing the classical stepwise merit-order curve by a linear merit-
order curve is a quite restrictive assumption. For a given time, in a real electricity market, start-up 
costs and additional non-convexities might challenge this hypothesis. However the scope of this article 
is to provide insights of phenomena taking place into IM, focusing on a single production hour. In this 
context, we considered that neglecting non-convexities constituted a reasonable assumption. The same 
argument also applies to the approximation by the supply function at different times .  
Picking the best strategy 
A wind power producer having chosen to participate in IM at times  and  will trade the quantity 
 at time  and pay a price . The total cost  for a participants being active at 
times  will therefore be the sum of these transactions
10
: 
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By opposition a producer staying completely out of the intraday market (what we defined as the 
passive strategy) will only buy the initial amount of energy at  and pay the imbalance costs 
corresponding to quantity  at time  The total cost will then be: 
 
In order to compare the efficiency of these two strategies, the chosen active strategy and the passive 
strategy, we will have a look at the expected value of the difference between these two total 
costs .  
 
 
The sign of  allows us to determine when it is more efficient to adopt the chosen active 
strategy ( ) or when it is more efficient to adopt the passive strategy 
( ). The player considered will be risk-neutral in our analysis. 
We will then compare the case of a player only active at times  with the case of 
the player in addition active at time  with . We will study the sign of 
  to determine whether it is worth or not being 
active at time  in addition to . 
4. Analytical results 
4.1 General case 
To express more precisely the value of  it is necessary to introduce the correlation 
coefficient  between  and  defined as:  
 
It is then possible to show the following result (see Appendix for demonstration): 
 
 
 
 
This result can deliver a few insights. First of all, the costs of picking the wrong strategy (whether it is 
to play or not at a given time in intraday markets) will be proportional to both the slope of the supply 
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curve  and the wind power production variability . In a system where wind production is 
steadier, for example because the wind is itself more steady or because wind farms are more dispersed, 
the errors will also be less important. In a system where the marginal costs of thermal plants, flexible 
or not, are roughly the same, it will matter less which ones are called to generate.  
In addition only the variance of the forecast error at each step matters. The result is not 
affected by the expected value of the error in each time . While these expected values might not 
be equal to zero, these terms tend to compensate each other as shown in our calculations in the 
appendix.  
Finally, the relevance of trading into these gates will be the result of a trade-off between the 
different members of this equation. The  terms are always positive and represent the “flexibility 
penalty” of buying energy latter in intraday markets when the generator adopts the active strategy. The 
term  is always negative and represents the same penalty paid in case the wind generator adopts a 
passive strategy. The value of the  term depends on the system characteristics and can be either 
positive or negative. If correlation  between  and  is poor then losses resulting from 
oscillating predictions will be high and it might not be worth trading in intraday markets.  
4.2 Results in a simple case with one gate closure in the intraday market  
In a recent study of the Spanish electricity market, Furió, Lucia et al. (2009) estimated that about two 
thirds of exchanges realised in the IM take place during the last possible platform. It means players use 
only one gate of the IM for a given hour. It is therefore interesting, in addition to being a good 
educational example, to study the case when the player is deciding whether to adjust its position (or 
not) at a single gate between the day-ahead electricity market and the generation time. 
Figure 5: Examples of typical forecasts for given sets of parameters 
  
Our approach consists in identifying for a given flexibility which forecasting abilities will lead to an 
active use of the additional gate. We introduce the ratio : 
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 is made of two components:  indicates how much information is gained between  and  while 
 is a measure of the correlation between these two pieces of information. An illustration with two 
steps is provided in Error! Reference source not found.. 
In our simple case when  we are able to identify two cases.  
Lemma 1.1 (see demonstration in annex): 
  
For a player being given the possibility to trade at time : 
: it will be beneficial to adopt an active strategy at 
time . 
Lemma 1.2 (see demonstration in annex): 
 
 For a player being given the possibility to trade at time : 
  / , : it will not be beneficial to adopt an 
active approach at . 
It is possible to go beyond these mathematical results and explore their meanings. In case  is low, 
there is little interest in trading at  since the forecast is not much more accurate. In case  is low, 
there is little interest in trading at  as there are higher risks of spoiling energy due to oscillating 
prediction errors. That’s why  is a key parameter.  
From Lemma 1.1, it is interesting for the producer to anticipate imbalances at  if the forecast 
error evolution is good enough.  
From Lemma 1.2, if the anticipation is not really helpful, i.e.  is low, then it can be interesting 
or not to anticipate imbalances. If imbalances are never very expensive it is not worth taking the risk 
of a wrong anticipation. 
4.3 Interest of trading at a given gate closure in the general case 
Most intraday markets feature several gates (six in Spain) or allow continuous trading. Therefore we 
will have a look in this section at a general case when a participant is adjusting its position in  
gates in the IM at times . We study the effects of being active at one more gate 
at time  and identify a set of criteria that will favour or discriminate against an active approach at 
this gate. By extension it is then possible to determine in which case a continuous market will be fully 
used by participants when  tends to infinity.  
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Lemma 2.1 (see demonstration in annex): 
For a player adopting an active strategy in IM at gate closure times  being given the 
possibility to trade at time  with  : 
 : it will be beneficial to 
adopt an active strategy at . 
Lemma 2.2 (see demonstration in annex): 
For a player adopting an active strategy in IM at gate closure times  being given the 
possibility to trade at time  with  : 
 
  it 
will not be beneficial to adopt an active approach at . 
We can deduce from lemma 2.2 that for a given flexibility of the power system and a specific forecast 
error evolution the active strategy might be more costly than the passive one. This result is coherent 
with the results obtained by Maupas, De Vos and Usaola.  
4.4 Results interpretation 
Liquidity in intraday markets 
A first insight we can get from our analysis is that poor liquidity in intraday markets may result from a 
rational behaviour of the participants. Our results indeed indicate that the poor liquidity of intraday 
markets could be explained by the poor information players have to deal with. Lemma 2.2 shows 
oscillating predictions can deter the players from trading in the IM provided it is not too expensive to 
procure energy in the balancing markets. This is an intuition already exposed by some of the authors 
mentioned in the section 0 of this article, but our results enlighten the key role played by the 
factor . When the value of this parameter is low, it means the gain of information when getting 
closer to real-time is not sufficient to compensate the oscillating nature of wind forecasts. Participants 
acting rationally will then choose not to adjust their positions between day-ahead markets and real-
time. Intraday markets will not be used by participants because they do not meet the needs of the 
participants. Even when participants wait until the last available trading time to adjust their position, 
thus using the best information available, it might still be not worth adjusting their position at this 
time, as illustrated in section 0. 
As long as conditions remain unsuitable, it will not be possible to increase both efficiency and 
liquidity by changing rules. Compelling wind power generators to trade in the intraday markets will 
Arthur Henriot 
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mechanically lead to a more liquid intraday market, but these obligations can potentially result in 
higher total balancing costs. Higher volumes should not be the objective of regulators. The volume of 
exchanges in the intraday markets will spontaneously rise (or decrease) following a higher penetration 
of renewables or technological changes. A prerequisite is obviously that the intraday markets must be 
in place in the power system, even if they are not used by most participants. If the forecasting tools 
become good enough, producers will then apply voluntarily what we defined as the active strategy, in 
order to minimise their costs, as shown in lemma 2.1.  
Similarly, setting penalties in real-time markets to incentivise participants to balance ex-ante their 
positions will lead to a higher participation in intraday markets, as in practice the extra cost  of 
trading in real-time will increase. However the actual costs of generating electricity will not be 
transformed by such financial penalties and these additional adjustments will not result in a higher 
efficiency. Increased participation in intraday markets will then be a form of hedge against imbalances 
with negative consequences similar to the ones described in Vandezande, Meeus et al. (2010). 
Discrete auctions vs. Continuous markets  
We emphasised in our previous section oscillating predictions could make it costly for generators to 
trade in intraday markets at a given time. In this section we will use this argument to compare the two 
main options available to design intraday markets: continuous markets and discrete auctions (Barquin 
2011). In a continuous market, bids are matched one by one as soon as they match (i.e. when the bid 
price is higher than the offer price). Continuous IM are for instance in place in Nordpool, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and France. The main alternative consists in a set of discrete auctions. The most 
famous example is the Spanish IM that features a sequence of six successive gates (see Furió, Lucia et 
al. (2009) for more details).  
By opposition to continuous markets, discrete auctions restrict trading to a set of pre-established 
times. Yet we know from our analysis that the strategy of a player will differ at different times. 
Depending on the wind forecast properties, a player might for instance be willing to trade at 10 a.m. 
but not at 9 a.m. or 11a.m. In a continuous market, players can use the experience they acquired day 
after day, and they will then be able to optimise their behaviour and trade when it is the most 
interesting for them. In a discrete market players will not be given such freedom: if conditions are not 
suitable (i.e. if the gates are set at times that do not fit this player) players will not trade, as shown by 
lemma 2.2. That’s why we argue restricting trading at imposed gates (as it is the case in an IM 
featuring discrete auctions) may lead to inefficiencies, additional costs, and lost trading opportunities. 
This result shall temper assumptions that discrete auctions will lead to increased trade in IM
11
. 
Obviously there are other sources of inefficiencies in continuous markets related to their inner 
fundamental properties: as trades are made on a first-come first-served basis in a continuous market, 
some trades that would not have taken place in a discrete market might take place, and the resulting 
prices will be less transparent. However, the decision to put into place continuous or discrete intraday 
markets should take into account the advantages of continuous markets that we described in addition 
to these drawbacks. 
It could be argued that the gate-closure times could be set in a way to reflect players’ preferences. 
It is however likely those preferences will not be the same for the different players: lemma 2.1 and 
lemma 2.2 reveal that for a given system and a given player, different wind forecast evolutions will 
lead to different strategies at a given gate. This result has important consequences as forecast 
                                                     
11
 The case for discrete auctions is often illustrated by the relatively high liquidity in the Spanish intraday markets. Yet it is 
important to take into account the fact that in the Spanish electricity market, portfolio bidding is not allowed. Therefore, 
as underlined by Pérez Arriaga (2005), a significant share of the volumes exchanged in the intraday markets is due to 
internal re-allocation by participants of the dispatch resulting from the daily market. It is not the case in most other 
European electricity markets where portfolio bidding is implemented. Therefore the case of the Spanish IM should be 
exploited carefully.  
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evolutions will differ for every single player, depending on the technology employed, the size of its 
generation park, and the geographical concentration of these assets. Offshore wind-farms for instance 
benefit from more consistent winds, while hills and buildings can generate turbulences that make it 
more difficult to predict the output of onshore wind farms. Random prediction errors will moreover 
tend to compensate when a single party is responsible for many wind turbines, particularly if they are 
spread on a wide geographical area (Holttinen, Meibom et al. 2009). 
As a consequence, and due to the key-role played by forecast evolutions and emphasised in our 
analysis, it will be challenging to content all the different players by setting a single set of discrete 
auctions. It would only be theoretically possible in the case of a single balancing responsible party, 
being a TSO (as in Germany) or a national aggregator for intermittent renewables. Gates should in this 
case be set after analysing wind forecast evolutions and should be regularly updated as forecasting 
technologies and the generation park evolve. Such a painful administrative process could be avoided 
by putting into place continuous markets. The losses would then offset the potential benefits from 
more efficient allocation in markets featuring discrete auctions. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we assessed the different strategies that could be employed in intraday markets by 
parties responsible for managing wind forecast error. Participants trading in intraday markets face a 
trade-off: being exposed to imbalance charges or adjusting positions in the intraday market when some 
relevant information is still missing. Therefore we developed a simple analytical model allowing us to 
take into account both the system flexibility (as the lower the flexibility, the higher imbalance charges) 
and the nature of the wind forecast evolution (as it determines the information available to 
participants). 
While discussions about optimal gate-closures usually focused on the average forecast error and the 
system flexibility when getting closer to real-time we demonstrated that correlation between forecast 
errors at different times should be taken into account. We were able to identify the parameter  
reflecting both the oscillating nature of wind forecasts and the level of information gained when 
getting closer to real-time. We showed this parameter plays a key-role in determining the participants’ 
strategies.  
Our analytical results underlined the fact that oscillating predictions could indeed explain the poor 
liquidity in IMs. In this case, a higher volume of exchanges in the intraday market should not be an 
objective per se as poor liquidity could simply reflect the fact taking part into these intraday markets 
will lead to higher costs: reducing total balancing costs should remain the main objective of regulated 
TSOs and regulators when establishing rules.  
Our analysis also revealed it was unlikely a set of gates would please all participants. Players 
responsible for balancing wind low-predictability will achieve cost-optimisation spontaneously if they 
are given the opportunity to trade when they need it. We argue continuous markets provide 
participants with a sufficient degree of freedom to express their needs. While the liquidity remains low 
in continuous markets in place in Europe it should yet become naturally higher with an increasing 
share of renewables in the generation mix, as incentives to reduce costs should lead participants to 
optimise their participation in intraday markets.  
It must be pointed out that our model has been designed to provide general insights about the 
behaviour of wind players in intraday markets. As a consequence, rather strong assumptions have been 
employed, and the results obtained might therefore not be universally valid. Relaxing some of the 
assumptions described in section 0 should however not impact our results significantly: for instance 
start-up costs that we neglected tend to increase when getting closer to real-time and could be 
internalised in the supply function. In this paper, it has also been considered that players are risk-
neutral. Risk-averse players might have stronger incentives to participate in IM (thus reducing their 
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exposure to imbalances in real-time markets) but our results should not be qualitatively impacted when 
relaxing this assumption. A possible extension of our work could be to test our analytical results 
numerically employing a more complex model of electricity markets. 
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Appendixes 
A.1 Nomenclature 
The following table contains a summary of the variables employed in this article.  
Variable Meaning 
 Number of gates after the day-ahead markets closure 
 Day-ahead market gate closure time 
 Production horizon  
 Closure time of the i
th
 gate of the intraday market  
 Total wind installed capacity  
,  Forecasted wind output at  for the production horizon  
 Realised wind output at the production horizon  
,  Net demand associated to  
,  Forecast error at time  as a share of the realised output 
 Expected value of  
,  Variance of  
 Variance of  
 Correlation coefficient between  and  
 Ratio representing the quality of the forecast evolution (see 0) 
a Constant parameter of the inversed supply-function at time  
b Slope of the inversed supply-function at time  
 System flexibility 
 Price associated to a net demand q when all units are available 
 
Function representing the extra-cost when trading at time  with 
flexibility  
 Price associated to demand  at time  
 Costs associated to an active strategy in intraday markets 
 Costs associated to a passive strategy in intraday markets 
 Expected value of the difference between  and  
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A.2: Expression of  
 
(1) 
By definition,  
 
(2) 
And  
 (3) 
Thus by developing (1) we obtain:  
  
  
(4) 
We will then estimate each of the four members of this equation  
 
 
 
 
By definition,  and  
Thus following notations defined in 0 we obtain: 
  (4.1) 
And by a similar process: 
  (4.2) 
 (4.3) 
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=  (4.4) 
Moreover: 
 
We can therefore write (4) as  
 
(5) 
Where: 
      
  
   
A.3: Proof of lemma 1.1: 
We apply equation (5) in the special case when  
 
(6
) 
As  
Hence   (7) 
We assume that  : the uncertainty increases with the prediction horizon.  
If we assume   we obtain the following results:  
 
(7.1) 
And as  
 
(7.2) 
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We also know that  as the flexibility penalty  increases with  
 (8) 
Using (7.1), (7.2) and (8) we can show that the following equation is verified 
 
(9) 
And according to (7) and (9),   
A.4: Proof of lemma 1.2: 
We assume   
By analogy to the proofs of (7.1) and (7.2), we can show:  
 
(10.1) 
 
 
 
(10.2) 
 
 
And therefore: 
 /  (11) 
 
 
As by definition  
 /  (12) 
Using (7),  / ,  
A.5: Proof of lemma 2.1: 
A player adopting an active strategy in IM at gate closure times  is being given the 
possibility to trade at time  with  
We make two assumptions.  
Assumption 1:  
Assumption 2:  
By definition it will be beneficial to adopt an active strategy at  if and if only : 
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 (13) 
Most of the terms are present on each side and by developing and simplifying (13) is equivalent to 
 
(14) 
Under assumption 1,  and therefore  
 (15.1) 
In addition we know that we assumed greater uncertainty further away from the production horizon: 
 (15.2) 
Using (15.1) and (15.2) 
 (16) 
And according to (16) it is possible to rewrite  as: 
  (17) 
We know have to show that inequality (17) is true to ensure that inequality (13) is true.  
Under assumption 2:  
Under assumption 1:  
 
(18.1) 
Besides  
  
  
As ,  (18.2) 
We also know that  as the flexibility penalty  increases with  
Hence using (18.1) and (18.2):  
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  (19) 
And (17) is verified, which is equivalent to : 
it is beneficial to play the active strategy. 
A.6: Proof of lemma 2.2: 
Similar to 1.2 using equation (17). 
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